A common practice in research evaluation is to present all available information about an institution, a research group, or a researcher to the decision makers. For example, when the University of Zurich (Switzerland) assesses an academic unit, comprehensive data on organization, resources, research, teaching, and services are compiled and made available to the external peers who evaluate the unit [2] . Such practices are based on the implicit assumption the "more information and analysis the better -ignorance stands in the way of good decision making" [3] . However, an emerging body of research questions this assumption: in numerous domains of decision making, ranging from finance and crime to medical diagnosis and sports forecasting, complex, information-greedy procedures can be outperformed by heuristics. Heuristics are simple decision strategies that ignore information [4] . In doing so, they can aid to make accurate, fast, effortless, and cost-efficient decisions without that trade-offs are incurred (e.g., effort versus accuracy). Moreover, because they are simple, heuristics allow making transparent decisions that can easily be communicated to and be understood by and others.
In this commentary, we discuss how such heuristics could be defined and empirically studied in the field of research evaluation. First, we will introduce the "science of heuristics" [4] and sketch out what questions could be answered when applying that body of work to evaluative bibliometrics (research evaluation based on publication and citation counts).
Second, to further illustrate our proposal, we will describe three bibliometrics-based heuristics [BBHs, 5] and explain how such heuristics could be employed to evaluate applicants for funding programs. Third, we will delineate four objectives for studying heuristics in research evaluation. Fourth, we will outline future research on BBHs, pointing to other heuristics and methods to investigate them.
The science of heuristics and bibliometrics
The physics consisted of 20 members who had to assess 6,446 papers. Since each paper has to be assessed by two reviewers, each reviewer had to read, on average, more than 600 papers in less than one year. "If every panel member, worked every day for ten months, each member would need to read and review 2.14 papers per day to complete the work on time. This is, of course, in addition to the panelist's usual full-time work load" [6] . The total costs for the REF 2014 have been estimated at £246m [7] .
Bibliometrics is a cost-efficient (though often criticized) alternative to peer review.
Pride and Knoth [6] [6] and Harzing [8] questions the use of expensive and time-consuming peer review processes. High correlations between bibliometrics and peer review were also found outside the REF [e.g., 9,10]. These results indicate that focusing on citation data only might not be a limitation in decision-making. Simple decision-making strategies are not necessarily less accurate than complex procedures, such as peer review.
The role of bibliometrics is particularly interesting in evaluation procedures in which peers are informed by indicators. How do peers use indicators in their judgments and how heavily do they rely on them? Could indicators partly or completely replace the judgment of peers? For example, the EMBO Young Investigator Programme -trying to support the best young researchers in the life sciences -requires that "applicants must have published at least one last author research paper in an international peer reviewed journal from independent work carried out in their own laboratory" [11] . Do the reviewers count the number of these papers for assessing the applicants and do they take the Journal Impact Factor (JIF) of these papers into account? Do they look at the h index of the applicants? Should they? Is the predictive power of bibliometric indicators so strong that peer review offers only marginal additional insights?
These and similar questions can be answered through the lens of the fast-and-frugal heuristics research framework, originally introduced by Gigerenzer et al. [1] to the cognitive and decision sciences, and extended to multiple other areas since then [e.g., 12, 13, 14] .
Heuristics can produce accurate, fast, effortless or otherwise smart decisions based on little information (hence fast-and-frugal). This has been shown in numerous computer simulations, mathematical analysis, and experiments [15, 16] . The assumption is not that a given heuristic will yield accurate decisions in all situations. Rather, the art of smart decision-making consists of selecting the heuristic that fits a given decision environment. Indeed, a large body of empirical evidence suggests that people seem to draw from a repertoire (an adaptive toolbox) of simplifying, fast and frugal heuristics in many domains of decision making, ranging from business and medicine to sports and crime [4] . Bornmann and Marewski [5] discuss in detail that this may also hold true for research evaluation.
Specifically, in exploring the potential of studying scientists' and evaluators' usage of heuristics in research evaluation as well as the performance of such heuristics, Bornmann and Marewski [5] introduce the notion of BBHs. These BBHs can exploit simple bibliometric statistics, such as citation or publication counts. In doing so, they may significantly reduce the efforts and time for decision making in research evaluation. Moreover, since BBHs are based on simple computations (e.g., mean citations in the case of the JIF), they are easy to understand and apply.
Research on BBHs does not ask whether bibliometric instruments are generally or always accurate and valid -as has been done in various critical statements on bibliometrics [e.g. 17]. Rather, analogous to the fast-and-frugal heuristics program, research on BBHs takes an ecological perspective and asks in which environment bibliometric instruments lead to satisfying judgements -and in which not. BBHs, as other fast-and-frugal heuristics, are conceived as adaptive judgement strategies that ignore information about some performance aspects (e.g., amount of third-party funds raised or assessments of single publications by experts), thereby allowing quick and robust decisions in research evaluation.
Key to BBHs and other heuristics is the notion of uncertainty. Uncertainty is what
characterizes decision making in the real world [18] . By definition, under uncertainty, not everything is known and surprises can occur. For example, not all possible courses of action or options, their outcomes, or probabilities of occurrence can be specified [see 19, 20] [see 21, 22 , for a discussion]. Heuristics are models for understanding and managing uncertainty.
They can perform well even when time, information-processing capacities, and knowledge are limited. Heuristics work, because they exploit the statistical structure of information in decision makers' environments and nestle into the workings of basic components of cognition, including the ways in which the perceptual and memory system encode, store, retrieve, and process information [23] .
The fast-and-frugal heuristics research program thus stands in the tradition of Nobel Laureate Herbert Simon's [24, 25] work. Simon stressed that cognition is adapted to the structure of environments. Moreover, he put forward the notion of bounded rationality which holds that human information processing capacities are limited. In contrast, the economic maximization models, which were dominant at Simon's time, did not assume such bounds, but conceived rational decision making in terms of an exhaustive and complex process, characterized, for instance, by collecting and evaluating all information, weighting each piece of information according to specific criteria, and mathematically integrating that information to come to an "optimal" solution. Despite Simon's critique, the unbounded rationality view and its remnants still can be found in science and society today and let people think that seemingly rational, exhaustive, information-greedy procedures always outsmart simple heuristics. Such thinking might fuel the view that complex research evaluation methods are generally to be preferred over simpler ones (e.g., simple bibliometric indicators). The consequence may be a missed opportunity: like other "mortals" [see 26], research evaluators do not have unlimited information-processing capacity, time, and knowledge. The science of heuristic applied to research evaluation might uncover ways of how to deal with such constraints. In the following, we will present two BBHs that could be employed for selecting candidates for a fellowship program (such as the EMBO Young Investigator Programme).
Models of bibliometric-based heuristics: Selection of applicants to fellow-ship programs
The one-cue BBH and the one-reason BBH are meant to be applied in the pre-selection and final selection of applicants. The two BBHs focus only on two dimensions: publications and citations. These BBHs implement lexicographic, non-compensatory decision processes, which are defined as follows [27] : "A decision is made lexically when a subject chooses A over B because it is judged to be better along a single, most crucial dimension, without regard to the other 'compensating' virtues that B might have relative to A. Thus, for instance, one would have chosen some restaurant A over B in a lexical fashion if one chose it because it were cheaper and did not care about other trait, like its quality, proximity, level of service, and so on" (p. 8). Lexical decisions are particularly suitable in uncertain situations, such as research evaluation which is characterized by the lack of knowledge about all consequences of decisions and probabilities of "correct" decisions [see 28].
Experts, who know which dimensions of a task are most important, seem to make decisions in a non-compensatory way. Betting on just the most important dimension is not a bad thing to do. The non-compensatory take-the-best heuristic [29] , for instance, has been found to make more accurate predictions than complex information-integration models (e.g., multiple regression) across 20 different task environments from psychology, sociology, demography, economics, health, transportation, biology, and environmental science [see 15, 16, 30] . Moreover, in many environments, the use of such heuristics can be a response of decision makers to situations where complex and frequent decisions need to be made but capacities and resources are limited.
As described by Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier [4] , heuristics consist of three building blocks: (1) search rules specify where to search for information, (2) stopping rules specify the end point of a search, and (3) decision rules specify how the final decision should be made.
These rules can be flexibly used to shape an assessment process.
One-cue BBH
Akin to other heuristics of consideration set generation [e.g., in consumer choice or probabilistic inference; see 31], the search, stopping, and decision rules of the one-cue BBH select, in a first step, from a pool of applicants the most promising candidates whom a peer review panel has, in a second step, to assess in detail. In pruning down candidates to a smaller consideration set [32] of promising ones this heuristic reduces the complexity, and in so doing, also the monetary costs of the evaluation procedure. 
Compare the performances of several applicants, P(1), P(2), P(3), … , P(m) using indicator i, with i(1), i(2) , i(3), … , i(m).
Suppose that x applicants can be selected. The applicants are sorted by i in descending order. If the rank position of P(m) <= x, P(m) is selected for panel discussion; if P(m) > x, the applicant is not selected.
One-reason BBH
Suppose that there are two applicants who performed very similarly in the past and the experts in the peer review panel have difficulties in selecting one of them for funding. In these situations, random selection has been proposed as selection mechanism [34] . One issue of random selection are the expectations of the applicants: applicants assume that decisions are based on scientific or meritocratic criteria only. Scientific and meritocratic selection could be ensured if bibliometric indicators are used as reasons in decision making (e.g., number of highly cited papers, number of collaborating authors, number of single-author publications, number of papers in reputable journals). For example, a one-reason BBH could be formulated to prevent random selection: (1) Select a reason (e.g., number of highly cited papers) and look for the corresponding scores of both applicants. (2) Compare the scores of the two applicants. Similar to the stopping rule implemented in the take-the-best heuristic, the one-reason BBH bases an inference on the first indicator that discriminates between the applicants, that is, on the first indicator for which one applicant has a significantly better score than the other [29] . Different search rules can be implemented. A simple option is to select the indicators from a bibliometric report about applicants randomly one by one [3] . This search rule corresponds to the one implemented in the minimalist heuristic [35] . A more elaborate search rule akin to that of the take-the-best heuristic could be used, in which the indicators are ordered by their importance for the specific objectives of the funding agency. If the goals are research excellence (first goal), high degree of collaboration (second goal), and interdisciplinary research (third goal), the selection starts with the number of highly cited papers, followed by the number of collaborating authors, and ends with the number of subject categories to which publications have been assigned.
The decision process of such a one-reason BBH can be formalized as follows [the formalizations are based on 33]. We compare the performances of two applicants: P(A) and
P(B). The bibliometric report about P(A, B) contains indicators i1, i2, i3, …, im. The scores of the indicators on applicant A are symbolized by i1(A), i2(A), i3(A), … , im(A) and the scores for applicant B by i1(B), i2(B), i3(B), … , im(B). Then, the decision rule of one-reason BBH is as follows: Infer P(A) > P(B) if and only if im(A) > im(B),
where in(A) = in(B) for all n < m.
Thus, indicators are inspected one at a time until an indicator is found that has different scores for the two applicants. The applicant with the higher score on this indicator is inferred to have the higher performance.
To compare the one-reason and one-cue BBH to more complex non-heuristic strategies, consider, for example a linear model which is used in university rankings [the formalizations are based on 33]. Suppose we compare the performance of two universities P (A) and P(B) using several (bibliometric) indicators i1, i2, i3 , …, im. The indicators used in university rankings are usually combined based on specific weights w1, w2, w3, …, wm.
Infer P(A) > P(B) if and only if
where wm ≥ 0.
In this linear model a weighted sum of indicator values is calculated for each university and the university with the higher sum is inferred to have the higher performance. to be worked out which indicator to include in the ranking and which weight should be assigned to each indicator.
Four objectives for studying bibliometric-based heuristics
Although the use of fast-and-frugal heuristics has never been studied empirically in the area of research evaluation [except for 3], a large body of experimental, simulation, and mathematical work suggests that heuristics can aid in inference, categorization, choice, and search tasks that are structurally similar to those faced in research evaluation [e.g., 14,18,38].
We think that adapting the fast-and-frugal heuristics research program to evaluative bibliometrics would be particularly useful, since such a move could base the (critical) discussion about bibliometric indicators on a conceptual ground [5] . In line with the goals of research on other heuristics, an exploration of BBHs would have, at least, three objectives [see 39].
(1) The first one is descriptive and asks which BBHs researchers and other decision makers use in research evaluation. What are the BBHs that evaluators rely on and how have these BBHs been acquired? Such descriptive questions concern the adaptive toolbox, which contains different heuristics decision makers can select from in order to adaptively respond to different decision situations [23] . For example, the adaptive toolbox for the decision procedures of a fellowship program could include a one-cue BBH and a one-reason BBH as first and last steps. 
Outlining future research on bibliometric-based heuristics: models and methods
In this comment, we focused on BBHs that select applicants of a fellowship program.
However, other decision strategies from the fast-and-frugal heuristics framework could be relevant for the field of research evaluation, too. We close this commentary by offering a snapshot of two such heuristics: hot-hand and recognition.
From hot hands to hot streaks
According to Raab and Gigerenzer [28] , the hot-hand heuristic has its origin in sports.
It "reflects the hot-hand belief held by many athletes, coaches, and fans that a player who has just scored two or three hits in a row has a higher chance of scoring again than if that player had just had two or three misses in a row". This heuristic has its correspondence in science in the hot streaks phenomenon described by Liu et al. [47] . The hot streak "highlights a specific period during which an individual's performance is substantially better than his or her typical performance" (p. 396). Liu et al. [47] investigated the publication records of about 20,000 researchers. They considered not only the publication output of the researchers, but also the impact of their publications (in terms of citations). The results of the study reveal that hot streaks in scientific careers exist (usually one, sometimes several): "The hot streak emerges randomly within an individual's sequence of works, is temporally localized, and is not associated with any detectable change in productivity" [47] . The consideration of hot streaks in research evaluations is important, since they drive the overall individual performance.
Their ignorance may lead to on over-or under-estimation of researchers' scientific potential.
Ignorance-based research evaluation
The recognition heuristic has been described by Goldstein and Gigerenzer [48] as follows: "If one of two objects is recognized and the other is not, infer that the recognized object has the higher value" (p. 76). When people rely on this heuristic, having less knowledge is better than more -with this heuristic, ignorance supports good decision making.
Interestingly, this heuristic has already been studied in the area of research evaluation.
Hertwig and Todd [3] interviewed some Americans and Germans who were familiar with the academic sector of their own country. Both groups should indicate which of the 50 highestranked American liberal arts colleges they recognized (listed in the US NEWS reference ranking). The results has been interpreted by the authors as follows: "What this means is that if we had asked our participants to choose higher-ranking colleges out of pairs of college names, the Germans could have used the recognition heuristic to pick those they recognized over those they did not, and this would have resulted in reasonably good choices (58 percent correct). In contrast, the Americans, who recognized most college names, would have made fewer good choices (54 percent correct)" [3] . The Americans could not rely on the recognition heuristic: They had heard of too many of the names. In contrast, the Germans, who were more ignorant and recognized fewer of the university names, could rely on this simple and accurate heuristic, this way boosting their performance.
The recognition heuristic and related memory-based heuristics [e.g., 49] may also represent simple models for studying citation and selection decisions [50] : when and to what extent are citations driven by familiarity with an author's name, and which selection decisions (e.g., in fellowship applications) are influenced by, for instance, an evaluator having heard of the name of an eminent referee (letter of recommendation writer) before?
Conclusion
To conclude, if we assume that researchers employ simple bibliometric shortcuts (i.e., ]. We think that those principles could also inform the study of BBH.
In short, with this commentary, we neither advocate nor condemn bibliometrics for research evaluation. Yet, bibliometrics are often criticized for being reductionist in research evaluation. We think it is time to ground that debate in a conceptual framework. After all, it
